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CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS AND THE
SUPREME LAW
KENT GREENAWALT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

What status do Supreme Court decisions have for officials in the
political branches of our government? Six months ago, Attorney General Edwin Meese III rekindled controversy over this enduring and
troublesome question when he claimed in a widely reported lecture'
that Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution are not the
supreme law of the land, and are properly subject to forms of opposition by other governmental officials. The general reaction to the
speech was that it was meant to reduce the perceived authority of
Supreme Court opinions, and a close reading of the speech certainly
leaves this impression. Yet, even one who is unsympathetic to that
apparent purpose must look hard to find passages that are definitely
unsound. Like many speeches by political figures, this one manages to
obscure or to avoid most controversial issues. What remains is a collection of platitudes plus some disquieting illustrations whose total
weight seems greater than the sum of the parts.
If this appraisal is accurate, the Attorney General's speech may
seem a poor starting point for an academic lecture. Professors are not
politicians. We are supposed to identify and struggle with hard issues,
not knock down straw men or spend much time chastising those who
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law. This is a somewaht
amplified version of the John R. Coen Lecture delivered at the University of Colorado School of Law
on April 8, 1987. I should like to thank Harold Edgar, Henry Monaghan, James Nickel, Stewart Sterk,
Peter Strauss, Richard Uviller, and Herbert Wechsler for their very helpful criticisms of earlier drafts.
My understanding of this subject has been enriched by a discussion of the Columbia Law School faculty
and by dialogue at Colorado at the time of the lecture.
1. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, delivered at Tulane
Univ., New Orleans, La. (Oct. 21, 1986).
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do. But focusing on what Mr. Meese has said turns out to be a useful
way to approach this subject. Mr. Meese did not ignore well-known
systematic treatments of the topic; the relevant dialogue has often consisted of oversimplification and oversimplified rebuttal. Careful analysis of the most recent oversimplifications can lead us to grasp what is
clear and what is not, to identify more precisely the factors that should
bear on the authoritativeness of Supreme Court decisions, and to move
to a deeper level of understanding whose value transcends the immediate concerns of this administration and its critics.
A moment's reflection reveals that disagreements over the authoritativeness of Supreme Court decisions do not relate in any easy way to
whether one is left or right on the political spectrum.2 The Attorney
General defends a state legislative challenge to the Supreme Court's
decision in Stone v. Graham,3 which barred the Ten Commandments
from being posted in public school classrooms.' His speech undoubtedly reflects discontent with other important Supreme Court precedents, and may in part be an oblique justification for the government's
direct urging that Roe v. Wade5 be overruled. But what is sauce for
the goose is also sauce for the gander. Given the persistent efforts of
the present administration to fill the federal courts with appointees
whose politics are in step with its own, many attacks on constitutional
decisions in the near future may come from the left. Of course, those
who wish the law and legal institutions destabilized might endorse an
approach that seeks to render all constitutional precedents more vulnerable, but one suspects that these are not bedfellows the Attorney
General would welcome.
The issue that the Attorney General discusses is both practical
and conceptual. The general practical issue is how much respect government officials should accord Supreme Court decisions on constitutional law, and, more particularly, how much respect they should
accord decisions that they think in some sense conflict with the Constitution. Once the critical problem is so understood, we can see that
different officials with different roles are potentially affected: Supreme
Court justices, lower federal and state court judges, legislators at federal, state and local levels, and members of executive branches performing various functions. We quickly become aware of the
2. However, giving decisions less authoritativeness may fit with a posture that is against such
judicial activism as freely overturns the choices of the political branches.
3. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
4. Meese, supra note 1, at 13. The speech challenges the criticism leveled at controversial appointee Daniel Manion for sponsorship of a bill to permit the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public school classrooms.
5. 410 U.S. 133 (1973).

1987]

CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS

possibility that the authoritativeness of a Supreme Court decision may
depend on what official and role are involved.
The conceptual issue concerns the boundaries of law. More precisely, it calls on us to determine what we mean by "law," "supreme
law," "legal duty" and "official duty." In undertaking that effort, we
need to avoid falling into some obvious and related traps.
The first is that there must necessarily be a transparent "eitheror" answer. Are private contracts "law"? The terms are legally binding on the parties but they have no broader import. Is everything that
courts are legally bound to take into account in deciding cases "law?"
In some cases, a court that refuses to look at critical scientific facts
may be failing to do its legal duty, but we do not ordinarily speak of
the relevant scientific truth as part of the law. Questions about what is
the law often call for an initial counter-question: "For what purpose
are we asking whether this is the law?" Similarly, before we decide to
apply other critical terms in this inquiry, we need to be aware of the
underlying purposes of the categorization.
The second trap to avoid is the idea that our conceptual answers
can be derived from common usage. Our common ways of speaking
do not provide a convenient set of terms and conceptual apparatus for
explaining the authority of Supreme Court decisions. Rather, what is
required is a sensitive appraisal of our political institutions, one that
draws from our country's traditions and makes functional judgments
about the roles of officials. The conceptual judgments, like the practical ones, depend partly on a normative interpretation of our legal
system.
The third trap is the notion that the conceptual inquiry is primary. Quite the contrary. We need first to consider the practical
questions carefully; we can then frame concepts that will most adequately reflect appropriate resolutions of these questions. If the practical questions are primary and appraisal of the authority of Supreme
Court decisions demands a normative interpretation of our legal system, the conclusions that one draws are bound to reflect judgments of
political morality.
Part of the reason why this topic is so difficult is that our Constitution does not specify the consequences of judicial declarations of
constitutional invalidity. Of course, it does not even explicitly establish judicial review; but review by federal courts of the validity of state
legislation follows almost ineluctably from the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI, 6 and review of federal legislative and executive acts was
probably envisioned by the drafters as well and has, in any event, been
6. That clause clearly requires state court testing of state laws against the federal constitution and
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firmly established since Marbury v. Madison.7 The solidity of our
practice of judicial review is not presently matched by broad agreement over the justification for such review and the implications of review for the political branches.
Roughly we can distinguish between "dispute resolution" and
"special function" models. According to the more traditional "dispute resolution" model, courts, including the Supreme Court, are in
the business of adjudicating disputes; they decide legal issues, including issues of constitutional law, only insofar as that is necessary to
resolve disputes; all branches of the government have the responsibility to act consistently with the Constitution and neither the Supreme
Court nor courts generally have any special function as guardians of
the Constitution.8 According to a "special function" model, the
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are the authoritative interpreters of the Constitution; an important part of their roles is announcing constitutional guidelines and educating others about
constitutional values.9 A downgrading of the authority of Supreme
Court decisions obviously fits more comfortably with a "dispute resolution" model than with a "special function" model, and that model is
drawn on implicitly by Mr. Meese.
A thorough treatment of my topic would require explication of a
theory of judicial review and of the functions of the three branches of
government, as well, perhaps, as a searching analysis of the nature of
law. Although I rely here on views about the structure of the Constitution and our political institutions as they have developed historically, I do not defend those views or even set them out systematically.
In large part, the reason is that I do not conceive the views on which I
rely as particularly controversial.
I want to argue strongly that even if one regards the Supreme
it would be highly anomalous for federal courts to treat as valid what state courts should declare
invalid.

7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-68

(1973). Most of the language of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), suggests the
"dispute resolution" model. In an illuminating response to the Meese lecture, Sanford Levinson in
Looking at the Constitution: CouldMeese Be Right This Time?, 243 THE NATION 689 (1986), compares

the view that all branches of government have responsibility to interpret the Constitution to the Protestant view of scriptural truth.
9. Monaghan, supra note 8, at 1368-71. The sentence in Marbury v. Madison that says: "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," is suggestive of
this model. The certiorari practice of discretionary Supreme Court review strongly supports the idea
that broad influence and education are an important part of the Supreme Court's function. Among
modem elaborations and defenses of the "special function" approach, two of the best known and most
powerful are Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976),
and Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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Court mainly through the lens of the "dispute resolution" model, its
constitutional decisions should ordinarily have much more authority
than Mr. Meese intimates. The argument, supported by judicial treatment of precedents, flows from the values of conflict avoidance, stability, and predictability. I do not mean to suggest that these values
should always dictate practices; sometimes conflict and instability are
necessary costs for adhering to other values. But conflicts, instability,
and unpredictability are not positively desirable, they are not to be
sought for their own sakes; and only substantial competing values can
warrant actions that one knows will have these effects to a significant
degree. I believe both that the Attorney General and I are in agreement on these premises and that significant conclusions can be drawn
from an analysis that builds on them.
Like the Attorney General's speech, I concentrate on reaction to
the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations. I do not undertake
a critical analysis of the manner in which the Court interprets the
Constitution. I, thus, do not here address the possibility that the main
technique for avoiding conflict should be greater judicial deference to
legislative and executive judgments, and that legislative and executive
disregard of controversial Supreme Court decisions might be a harsh
but needed corrective to bring the Court into line. Mr. Meese does not
propose his own position as one designed to change the way the
Supreme Court itself interprets, and I do not attempt the comprehensive evaluation of the Court's role that would be needed to assess that
sort of defense of his position.
My main strategy in dealing with the underlying practical and
conceptual questions is to distinguish various officials and their roles,
and discuss them in turn. Although I explain what Mr. Meese supposes when he takes a position, my main aim is to offer suggestions
about sound approaches and to indicate how these may be conceptualized. Before turning to the nonjudicial officials in whom the Attorney
General is interested, I treat the more familiar terrain of the responsibilities of judges. Reflection on these helps focus the normative evaluation and terminology appropriate for officials in the political
branches. Prior to embarking on that task, I give a more precise account of the practical questions the Attorney General's speech raises
and of the terminology in which those questions may be cast.
II.

ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL

DECISIONS AS LAW

For the most part, the Attorney General's lecture refers to
Supreme Court decisions as being "law," but not as being "supreme
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law." He does quote approvingly the famous constitutional historian
Charles Warren, who wrote "it is still the Constitution which is the
law, not the decisions of the Court," 10 but Mr. Meese goes on to say
that "Warren did not mean that a constitutional decision by the
Supreme Court lacks the character of law." The Attorney General's
explanation of what he means is one of the more important and elusive
passages in his talk:
Obviously it [a constitutional decision] does have binding quality:
It binds the parties in a case and also the executive branch for
whatever enforcement is necessary. But such a decision does not
establish a "Supreme Law of the Land" that is binding on all persons and parts of government, henceforth and forevermore."'
Here, the Attorney General obviously acknowledges that parties
to a case are bound by the final decision; they are not complying with
the law in some sense if they fail to do what the decision dictates.
Since the executive branch of federal or state government is often a
party to constitutional cases, it must adhere to a decision in respect to
the other party. If the Supreme Court orders a conviction reversed
because illegal evidence was used, the government cannot continue to
treat the defendant as properly convicted. In speaking of "necessary
enforcement" of decisions, Mr. Meese supposes that the executive
branch may have responsibilities in cases to which it is not a party.
When two private persons are the contesting litigants and one party
needs executive help to enforce12 the judgment, that branch is bound to
render appropriate assistance.
In terms of what he concedes about the force of a constitutional
decision by the Supreme Court, this is as far as the Attorney General
explicitly and unambiguously goes in his lecture.I 3 The limitedness of
this concession yields a very important substantive point and a related
terminological one. Mr. Meese's language leaves unclear whether the
executive, when it is a party to a case, must conform with the decision
as the decision potentially affects nonparties. If the Court declares a
search of a certain type to be violative of the fourth amendment, must
the government refrain from carrying out such searches? The speech
does not tell us. It also does not address whether the executive
branch, when it is not a party, should adhere to the principles underly10. Meese, supra note I, at 7.
11. Id.
12. The federal executive might similarly have a duty to enforce when one of the litigants is a
state agency.
13. The language I have quoted might be taken to imply that the executive must "enforce" the
decision as to anyone the principle of the decision evidently reaches. Given all else he says in the
lecture, I am inclined to think that is not what Mr. Meese means.
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ing a decision as those principles affect nonparties. If, in a private suit
by a rejected applicant, the Court says that an executive order requiring nondiscrimination in hiring is unconstitutional insofar as it bars
religious organizations from using religious criteria in hiring, may the
executive continue to try to enforce the order for other applicants for
jobs with religious organizations? Taken at face value and in relation
to the rest of his lecture, the Attorney General's sentence about enforcement seems to reach only the parties who are directly covered by
a judgment and the enforcement required to give effect to the judgment. If this is all that Mr. Meese regards as the legal import of a
decision, he does take a radically minimalist view of the force of the
Supreme Court's constitutional decisions.
The terminological point is linked to this substantive one. If all
anyone is required to do is to enforce the judgment, it is strange to
speak of a constitutional decision as "law." The point can be illustrated by reference to a judgment that is plainly mistaken, and has no
authority beyond its disposition for the parties involved.
Suppose a lower court, through the blunders of counsel and stupidity, renders a decision in a minor dispute that is blatantly at odds
with what a higher court has recently and unanimously decided about
precisely the same legal issue. No appeal is taken. The judgment then
binds the parties, and the executive branch is bound to enforce it. But
the executive branch would not treat the lower court decision as having broader effect. The binding quality of a judgment does not alone
make law in the ordinary sense, any more than an umpire's mistaken
but unreviewed interpretation of the rules is bound to be followed,
even though it controls what happens in the game in which it is made.
By what he does not say as well as by what he does say, the Attorney
General really does raise the question whether constitutional decisions
are "law," not only whether they are "supreme law."
Though the precise boundaries of Mr. Meese's skepticism are
neither very clear nor very important in the long run, his remarks
challenging the authority of the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations for legislative and executive action do raise fundamental
questions about the nature of our legal order, and about what counts
as law within that order. My investigation of those questions focuses
first on the judiciary itself.
III. JUDGES AND SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In denying that Supreme Court constitutional decisions constitute '
''supreme law," the Attorney General points out that they can be
overruled by the Court itself. If these decisions had the same status as
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the Constitution, overruling would obviously be inappropriate. Mr.
Meese says, "[t]he Constitution, the original document of 1787 plus its
amendments, is and must be understood to be the standard against
which all laws, policies and interpretations must be measured."' 4 In
assessing the accuracy of this statement, we can explain a good ,deal
about rather settled understandings regarding the status of the Court's
constitutional decisions for the judiciary.
I began by noting that the proper interpretive strategies for construing the Constitution and the results yielded by particular strategies
are bound to be controversial in the difficult cases argued before the
Supreme Court.' 5 Thus, it is extremely unlikely that a constitutional
decision by the Court will be obviously at odds with the Constitution.
We might take as a standard of obviousness what virtually all reasonable lawyers would agree upon after moderate reflection. Since five
justices will not vote contrary to what reasonable lawyers agree upon,
Supreme Court decisions will not obviously conflict with the Constitution according to contemporaneous understanding. After the passage
of generations a decision may appear obviously wrong, but by that
time it will also appear wrong to the sitting Supreme Court justices. I
am going to simplify just a little bit by assuming that Supreme Court
decisions are not obviously at odds with the Constitution.
What it means practically, then, to say that the Constitution is
"the standard" against which constitutional interpretations are to be
measured is that someone employing what he or she thinks are correct
interpretive standards may appropriately declare Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution to be incorrect, or act as if they are incorrect, or both. Like the Attorney General, I shall not focus on
criticism by itself, for example, a Senator or state court judge expressing disagreement with Supreme Court doctrine in a law review; I concentrate on institutional actions that reflect rejection of what the
Supreme Court has said.
A. Lower Courts
Although Mr. Meese does not talk about state and lower federal
court judges, reflection on their roles shows how deceptively misleading any unvarnished statement about the priority of the Constitution
over the Supreme Court's interpretations of it can be. How are other
14. Meese, supra note 1, at II.
15. I take as plain the proposition that most "easy" constitutional issues do not arise in litigation
or are disposed of in the lower courts without full Supreme Court review. The issues that the Supreme
Court considers are far more debatable on the average than all litigated constitutional issues; and all
litigated constitutional issues are more debatable on the average than the collection of conceivable
constitutional questions.
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judges to take the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations?
Our traditions of judicial hierarchy provide fairly definite answers.
Even if lower court judges believe a Supreme Court interpretation is
inaccurate, they are bound to follow it. When I say they are bound to
follow the decision, I want to mention two important qualifications.
First, there are situations in which a judge of an inferior court
may think overruling of a Supreme Court precedent in the pending
case is likely. Suppose, for example, that President Reagan in a short
period of time manages to appoint three new justices who in their previous professional lives have consistently opposed the result in Roe v.
Wade. 6 A state court judge might think it probable that the new
Supreme Court will wholly abandon the principle of Roe v. Wade.'
Whether the judge's duty is then to follow Roe v. Wade until it is
actually overruled is not a matter of common agreement. I mean to
put aside this fairly unusual situation here. 8 I am thinking of decisions that judges of the lower courts have reason to suppose the
Supreme Court will follow in the foreseeable future.
My second qualification concerns cases that are not on all fours
with the precedent case but seem fairly likely to be decided the same
way. Uncertainty may arise because the Supreme Court has commented on the critical point only in dictum. Or the new case may not
itself be covered by anything the Supreme Court has yet said or established. Imagine that the lower court is asked to extend a Supreme
Court precedent in a way it thinks that the Supreme Court will probably do. In Escobedo v. Illinois,9 the Supreme Court dealt with police
interrogation after a suspect had requested and been refused access to
his own counsel. The Court said that, absent a warning of a right to
silence, use of what is said in such an interrogation violates a right to
counsel. Many observers predicted that having gone this far, the
Court would find a similar right against interrogation on behalf of persons held in custody who have not requested counsel. Those predictions proved correct in Miranda v. Arizona.2" What should a lower
court have done prior to Miranda if it predicted that something like
the Miranda ruling probably would follow but thought that Escobedo
was ill-conceived and should not be extended? Though I do not un16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. An interesting historical illustration of a decision that was effectively overruled rather soon
after its issuance is Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled in Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the case striking down compulsory saluting of the flag in public
school.
18. A less unusual situation is one in which later Supreme Court decisions themselves substantially erode the authority of some older case that has not been explicitly overruled.
19. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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dertake to defend my view here, treating lower court decisions as no
more than predictions of what the Supreme Court will decide would
be mistaken; room exists for lower court judges to exercise independent judgment and make a creative contribution when it is not certain
whether the Supreme Court will extend or limit a precedent. I am
putting aside such circumstances here, and focusing on a case that
cannot reasonably be distinguished from what the Supreme Court has
already held once or many times.
If a case is clearly covered by a Supreme Court precedent and
overruling is not a reasonable probability, our common law traditions
treat lower courts as bound to follow the Supreme Court. That tradition is supported by strong institutional considerations. Were lower
courts free to substitute their own preferred constitutional interpretations for those of the Supreme Court, one of two lamentable consequences would obtain. Even in respect to issues "settled" by Supreme
Court decision, the outcome of federal constitutional cases would depend on which lower court litigants happened to get the case into, or
extensive appeals would be needed to reach uniformity of treatment.
When deviations involved trial courts substituting their own interpretations for those of the Supreme Court, the expense and delay in review and retrials would be very great indeed.
The brief analysis provided here does not depend on positing any
unique function for the Supreme Court in constitutional cases; rather
it rests on ordinary ideas of judicial hierarchy. The analysis suggests
that in cases closely similar to ones resolved by the Supreme Court,
lower courts do not use the Constitution independently as a standard
to measure the Supreme Court's decisions, and that there are extremely good reasons why they do not do so. This conclusion should
lead us to consider with open minds how much of such measurement
is appropriate for other officials.
B. The Supreme Court
Does the authority of the Supreme Court to overrule its own constitutional decisions establish, as Mr. Meese suggests, that these decisions are not the supreme law as far as the Supreme Court is
concerned? An important germ of truth lies in this conclusion, but the
issue is more complex than he recognizes.
I begin with the question whether susceptibility to overruling
means that constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court are not really "law" at all. The short answer to this question is "No." Species
of law may be subject to change by judicial decision. We think of
common law precedents as a kind of law even though in the United
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States precedents may be overruled by the court that has established
them, and this is done with some frequency. The practice of overruling does not mean that precedents have no legal force. It is a commonplace that following precedents is more important in some
common law areas than others,2 but if we were to generalize we might
say something like: "A court should follow its own well-established
precedents unless those precedents are seriously out-of-line with other
common law or statutory rules or are seriously unjust."
Does some similar understanding exist about constitutional law
decisions? How far the Supreme Court should follow its own constitutional precedents is more controversial than common law practices.
One conceivable position is that a constitutional precedent should
count for no more than the persuasiveness of its reasoning as far as any
justice's vote on the merits in a subsequent case is concerned. In a
case before the Court, a responsible justice would read prior opinions
dealing with similar issues, but majority opinions would count intrinsically for no more than dissenting opinions or well-reasoned briefs or
scholarly writings. Independent of prior results, each justice would
decide how the Constitution should be interpreted and apply that interpretation to the facts of the present case. A suggestion that prior
interpretations be measured against the Constitution may intimate this
conceivable practice, but that practice certainly would differ from
present and traditional practice.
In the first place, justices who are prepared to overrule earlier
decisions often do not vote to do so unless they have a majority that
agrees. This caution is not a mere formality; it can affect the results of
some cases. Suppose that seven justices think an exclusionary rule is
called for in respect to evidence seized by state officers in violation of
the fourth and fourteenth amendments.2 2 Two justices think Mapp v.
Ohio2" was wrongly decided and that the federal exclusionary rule
should not apply to state cases. They are ready to overrule Mapp but
decline to so do until supported by three other justices. A case comes
up in which three justices think a state search complies with the fourth
amendment; six justices, including the two who are prepared to overrule Mapp, think the search was unconstitutional. If these two apply
21. The most critical variable is the need for certainty and predictability. A court is very hesitant
to overturn rules of law upon which people have depended heavily in planning their affairs.
22. The formulation in this sentence assumes that the Due Process Clause or Privileges and Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the substantive standards of the
fourth amendment. I use the phrase "called for" to fudge the question whether the Constitution directly requires an exclusionary rule or the rule is deemed an appropriate judicial device to promote
adherence to the fourth amendment when other sanctions have proved impotent.

23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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the rule of Mapp, the vote will be 6-3 against the state; if they vote to
reject the exclusionary rule in this case, the state will win, since they
will join the three justices who think the search was legal in voting to
sustain admission of the evidence. In this case, a decision not to vote
to overrule will affect the outcome. The position that I have sketched
is one many justices have taken on various issues.
Let us suppose now that a justice is deciding whether to vote to
overrule if his or her vote could contribute to a majority taking that
position. The language of Supreme Court justices sometimes echoes
Mr. Meese in suggesting that no rule at odds with the Constitution
should continue to be followed. But the reality is more complicated.
Most justices think continuity counts for something. They will follow
a constitutional opinion that is at odds with what they think an initially correct decision would have been if the opinion is not too wrong.
In deciding whether to overrule, they will be affected by how confident
they are the decision is wrong, how mistaken they think the decision
is, how unjust they deem the rule it establishes, and how disruptive
they think a decision to overrule would be. Justices do continually use
the Constitution, understood in light of the interpretative practices
they think best, as a standard to measure prior decisions; but with
some frequency justices follow prior decisions that are not in accord
with what they think would be the soundest disposition of a case if
prior decisions were to be put aside. Though for a variety of reasons,
including the difficulties of formal constitutional amendment, justices
are more willing to overrule constitutional decisions than other decisions, they often do accept prior decisions as law even when they think
those decisions do not square with the Constitution as ideally
interpreted.
Trying to determine the appropriate degree of deference to prior
decisions is among the hardest of tasks for Supreme Court justices.24
What I have said about present practices is no real help in coping with
that problem, but it does suffice to show that an appropriate judicial
philosophy on the subject cannot be constructed out of a wooden
statement that the Constitution stands higher than the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions.
IV.

LEGISLATORS AND EXECUTIVES AND SUPREME COURT

DECISIONS

I now address the main subject of the Attorney General's lecture,
24. Perhaps the Attorney General's lecture was partly intended to encourage a less respectful
attitude toward precedent among Supreme Court justices. But Mr. Meese advances no arguments for
this position and does not even state it.
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the appropriate attitude of officials in the political branches toward
Supreme Court decisions. Again, I emphasize that I am focusing on
the performance of institutional responsibilities directly affected by a
decision, not on whether officials should be free, as I think they should
be, to state their opinions about the soundness of what the Court has
determined.
The Attorney General comments at some length on Lincoln's
view, expressed in debates during his Senatorial contest with Stephen
Douglas, that the Dred Scott decision should be opposed "as a political
25
rule" binding on voters, members of Congress, and the President.
Mr. Meese says that each of the three coordinate branches "has a duty
to interpret the Constitution in the course of its official functions. In
fact, every official takes an oath precisely to that effect." 2 6 Indicating
that responses to decisions that people disagree with can be made
through political representatives at the national, state and local
levels, 27 Mr. Meese explicitly defends the efforts of state legislators to
adopt measures at odds with the Supreme Court's decision barring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms.2 8
Let me start with two obvious points. Members of nonjudicial
branches do have a responsibility to interpret the Constitution. Legislators should generally not pass measures which they believe are unconstitutional, and this responsibility goes beyond avoiding judicial
invalidation of what they have done.2 9 Some aspects of constitutional
law are not judicially enforceable; members of the legislative and executive branches should nevertheless observe constitutional limits as
they understand them. The second obvious point is that the oath of
office does not settle how far legislators and executive officials should
defer to Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution, any more
than a similar oath settles the responsibilities of federal and state
judges with respect to Supreme Court precedents.
As I have indicated with respect to lower court judges, officials in
the political branches may consider the relevance of Supreme Court
precedents in various contexts. The most stark issue is posed when
officials consider practices that are plainly at odds with what the
Supreme Court has decided and seems likely to decide in the near fu25. Meese, supra note 1, at 9-10. Excerpts from Lincoln's statements in his debates with Douglas
and in his First Inaugural Address are reproduced in G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28-29
( lIth ed. 1986).
26. Meese, supra note 1, at 11.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id. at 13.
29. See generally Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). What the executive should do if required by legislation to do something it
believes is unconstitutional is addressed below.
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ture. I shall concentrate on that sort of issue, but before I do so, I
briefly consider other circumstances involving legislative and executive
disagreement with what the Supreme Court has said.
A. Disagreements That Do Not Generate Clear and Direct
Conflicts
In some circumstances no practical conflict may be posed between legislative or executive disposition and constitutional rule,
though the basis for supporting the disposition flows from an official's
disagreement with Supreme Court doctrine. A famous example involved Andrew Jackson's veto of a bill to recharter the Bank of the
United States." ° In McCulloch v. Maryland,a" the Supreme Court held
that the creation of a national bank was within the power of the federal government. But plainly the government has no obligation to create or continue a national bank. If belief that the bank was not
constitutionally authorized led to a failure to continue the bank, nothing was actually done that conflicted with the Court's rule of law. The
same can be said of Thomas Jefferson's pardon of those convicted
under the Sedition Act, which Jefferson asserted was unconstitutional.3 2 Parallel modem examples would be legislative opposition to
the death penalty, or executive commutation of that penalty, based on
a belief that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, despite the
Supreme Court's decision that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional. Even in situations like these, an argument in terms of the
Supreme Court's special competence and the desirability of a uniform
government voice might be made that officials in the political branches
should accept judicial interpretations as correct, but the argument
would be relatively weak. Here uniformity is not particularly important, and there is little reason why the legislature or executive should
not do for perceived constitutional reasons what it can do for nonconstitutional policy reasons, that is, decline to enact proposed legislation,3 3 or exercise executive clemency.34 (I here pass over the
30. See Gunther, supra note 25, at 27-28. For the purpose of a division in this Essay between
legislative and executive action, vetoes of bills and legislative proposals by executive agencies count as
types of legislative action.
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
32. See Gunther, supra note 25, at 26 for Jefferson's explanation.

In this instance the courts

upholding the act's constitutionality had been federal courts other than the Supreme Court. I do not
discuss in this Essay the important question of how far the executive should regard itself as constrained

by constitutional interpretations of lower courts on issues that have not yet reached the Supreme Court.
33. A somewhat special analogue exists when Congress enacts legislation that allows states to
regulate commerce in a manner the Supreme Court has previously held violates the "dormant" commerce clause. Members of Congress might disagree with the Court that state regulation of this sort is
unconstitutional in the absence of Congressional legislation. But since Congress's authority to regulate
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possibility that executive clemency is not properly exercised in opposition to any general policy judgment embodied in enacted law.)
With some frequency, legislators and executive officers consider
practices that are different from what the Supreme Court has held invalid but that appear vulnerable given Supreme Court doctrine. For
example, a legislator thinks it fairly likely, but far from certain, that
the Supreme Court will strike down a proposed new practice. If the
legislator thinks the Supreme Court doctrine is sound and should be
extended to invalidate the practice, he should vote against authorizing
the practice. But suppose he thinks the existing doctrine is unsound
and should certainly not be extended. He should feel free to vote for
the practice if he thinks it is desirable and has a reasonable chance of
being sustained. That the legislature's constitutional judgments
should not amount simply to predictions of future Supreme Court decisions is more evident than my similar claim about judgments of
lower courts. If, as virtually all commentators suppose, the development of constitutional law should represent some kind of dialogue between the courts and political branches, legislative indications that
existing decisions should not be extended to new practices are fully
appropriate. Passage of legislation authorizing such practices is
proper.
Something closely similar is involved when the legislature apcommerce allows it to permit a state regulation that would otherwise be unconstitutional, the practical
effect of its legislation is to erase the Court-imposed restriction and no conflict between its action and
the Court's ruling exists.
34. The contrast I draw between situations like these and circumstances in which some direct
conflict is generated omits some troublesome intermediate categories. On some occasions, the political
branches may do something that is plainly unconstitutional given Supreme Court interpretations but is,
in context, beyond court review. Imagine that Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), was overruled, and
that neither a federal taxpayer nor anyone else had standing to challenge a federal expenditure of funds
claimed to violate the Establishment Clause. Suppose that the Supreme Court consistently struck down
a certain kind of expenditure when made in states and challenged by state taxpayers (the Supreme
Court continuing to allow states to treat that standing question as one of state law) on the ground that
the expenditures violated the federal Establishment Clause. Congress, believing the Court wrong, considers authorizing an identical expenditure, which would be effectively unreviewable. Were the expenditure made, no practical conflict with the courts would be generated, but since what would be done
would be directly at odds with expectations about constitutional limits created by Supreme Court cases,
some of the reasons discussed below why Congress should hesitate to act contrary to those interpretations apply.
Another intermediate situation is one in which executive action that is in some sense discretionary
is needed to protect declared constitutional rights. Suppose that the Supreme Court announces a constitutional right of private citizens against state officers. In one state, officials do not observe the right
and civil remedies are ineffective. The federal government recognizes that only federal prosecutions of
state officials will protect the rights, but the federal executive thinks the Court's constitutional interpretation was wrong. A failure to prosecute will not itself be unconstitutional, see generally K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 348-59 (1987), but the practical effect will be to frustrate
individual expectations about guaranteed rights. Again, some of the reasons for following the Supreme
Court's interpretation apply here.
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proves a practice that the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional but does so in a context that is fundamentally different from the
one the Supreme Court has faced. Mirandav. Arizona provides a right
to counsel for criminal suspects. Suppose a state legislature considers
giving all suspects well-informed lay advocates but not actual attorneys. Miranda,which rests finally on the privilege against self-incrimination, does not settle whether such a scheme would be
constitutional. A proper determinant of a legislator's vote would be
his or her own view whether the proposed practice should be held to
be constitutional. Perhaps the ambit of independent judgment for executive officers is generally narrower, but they too may face situations
with respect to which the Supreme Court has not yet spoken clearly,
and their own views about proper constitutional interpretation should
matter.
Finally, on rare occasions legislators and executive officials, like
lower court judges, may have powerful reasons to think a precedent
may be overruled. In such instances, if they also think the precedent is
ill-founded and should be overruled, they may appropriately adopt a
law or engage in a practice that will test the precedent.
B. Stark Conflicts
What I have said so far is enough to indicate that not only do
legislators need to interpret the Constitution when they address issues
largely untouched by Supreme Court precedents, they make independent constitutional judgments in other instances in which precedents do
bear significantly. Unfortunately, these observations do not carry us
very far in regard to stark conflicts.
The Court has issued a constitutional decision. The legislature
considers a measure that would require or authorize behavior that is
clearly unconstitutional according to the Supreme Court, and no one
predicts that the Court will soon change its mind. This, I think, is a
fair characterization of state bills authorizing public schools to post
the Ten Commandments on their walls after Stone v. Graham."
35. This characterization is not wholly beyond dispute. The statute struck down by the Court
required the posting of the Ten Commandments. The bill supported by Daniel Manion only authorized
local school districts to post the Ten Commandments. Without further analysis, the bill might be seen
as involving a practice different from that passed on by the Supreme Court. But it has been a consistent
theme of Establishment Clause law that a local school district cannot do things the state legislature
cannot require. Neither in that law nor in the language of Stone v. Graham is there any basis for
distinguishing a required posting from a school district's voluntary posting. Thus, the slim difference
between the law struck down in Stone and the bill sponsored by Judge Manion does not seem relevant.
What matters more for my purposes than the best characterization is that given by the Attorney
General and Judge Manion. Though the former mentions the difference between requirement and authorization, he actually uses the example in the same way I do, as expressing a direct legislative disa-
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1. The Basic Reason Against Conflicting Legislation

In evaluating the appropriateness of such legislation, we need
briefly to consider the position of the executive branch. I assume that
if a legislative body appropriately issues legislation that is directly at
odds with a Supreme Court decision, an executive who agrees with the
judgment of the legislature and disagrees with that of the Court may
act on the legislation.3 6 The contrary view would be paradoxical. If
the executive is always supposed to conform with Supreme Court interpretations, fresh legislation contrary to these interpretations would
have no point. The legislature might then better express its disapproval of what the Court has done by a simple resolution to that effect.
Thus, any sensible position that legislatures appropriately act on their
own interpretations directly in the face of Supreme Court decisions
must include the notion that a sympathetic executive branch may enforce the legislation.
Once this point is clear, the basic objection to fresh legislation is
also clear. Such legislation sets up an obvious conflict between the
legislative and judicial branches. The Court says that the Ten Commandments cannot be posted in public school classrooms; the state
legislature authorizes the posting; local school boards and principals
post the Ten Commandments; suit is brought and the posting is forbidden and the law is declared invalid. There may be no intrinsic reason why matters should stop after the first round, and the rounds of
conflict could continue indefinitely. One thing to be said in favor of
such legislation is that it contributes to dialogue about the appropriate
range of constitutional constraints, but the price is very high. Adopting legislation that flies directly in the face of Supreme Court decisions
is not lightly to be recommended, particularly since Congress and the
state legislatures can register their disapproval directly by actions
aimed toward constitutional amendment, and Congress can curtail the
Court's jurisdiction.3 7 But suppose that a constitutional decision
works some very serious wrong, as the Dred Scott38 decision was
deemed by Lincoln to have done, and there is some hope of its being
greement with a Supreme Court decision. For purposes of evaluating the judge's act as a legislator, his

own opinion about the relation of bill to decision would be important. If, for example, he genuinely
thought Stone left open voluntary posting by school districts, he might be subject to criticism for failure
to grasp principles of substantive constitutional law, rather than for showing insufficient respect for
Supreme Court precedents.
36. I postpone for the next section the more troublesome question of appropriate executive response when the executive disagrees with the legislature.
37. See Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004-06 (1965).
38. 60 U.S. 398 (1856).
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overruled eventually. If a decision is egregious enough, a legislative
response that flies in its face may be appropriate.
Once we reach the tentative conclusion that legislation that directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions is
rarely but sometimes warranted, we face the double task of identifying
more specifically what are relevant considerations and of conceptualizing the legislature's responsibilities.
2. Relevant Considerations
Because there are significant costs to the operation of law when
measures are adopted that are at odds with constitutional decisions,
such a strategy should be undertaken only when a decision is regarded
as clearly wrong and seriously unjust. Legislatures should not contradict the Court when legislators lack confidence that the Court's interpretation is mistaken or understand that only minor social issues are
involved.
Since the main practical point of fresh legislation is to register
disapproval in a kind of dialogue with the Court, it matters how constructive any such dialogue is likely to be. The more firmly fixed a
constitutional interpretation is, the less value an expression of contrary
legislative judgment will have. On a discrete issue, one contrary expression by a legislature should be the limit. By adopting a measure
contrary to the Supreme Court's interpretation, the legislature has
made its point of view known. If, after litigation, the Court reconfirms
its initial position, or, by declining review of lower court decisions adhering to the original precedent, refuses to reconsider the position, the
legislature should be extremely hesitant to pass yet another contrary
statute. Doing so is a prescription for internecine warfare. As Herbert
Wechsler said in 1965: "When [the chance for overruling] has been
exploited and has run its course, with reaffirmation rather than reversal of the decision, has not the time arrived when acceptance is demanded, without insisting on repeated litigation?" ' 39 Matters are more
complicated when the Court's doctrines appear to invalidate a great
range of social programs, as during the early New Deal period, and
the legislature responds with a variety of new laws that raise central
themes in different contexts. But some realistic prospect. for success
remains highly important.
39. Id. at 1008. It is a genuine question whether legislative opposition can ever be appropriate if
the path of overruling has been pursued unsuccessfully and no change in the situation promises a
different outcome in the future. I am inclined to think that very rarely, a constitutional decision might
be so egregious that direct legislative opposition would be warranted although plainly without any
likely effect on the Court.
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Another relevant factor is the nexus between a constitutional decision and individual rights. Some rare constitutional decisions do not
involve individual rights at all: the Court deals with government bodies and no individual privileges turn on the outcome. More commonly, an individual claim of right is tied to the functions of branches
of government; the basic constitutional issue concerns separation of
powers among branches of the federal government or the division of
authority between state and federal governments, and the Court's resolution of the issue sustains or rejects an individual's claim not to be
imposed upon by a particular government agency. Individual rights in
the strongest sense are involved when the Court decides that the Constitution prohibits a particular kind of treatment, say an interference
with one's revolutionary speech or a warrantless wiretap of one's
telephone.
Although the view that I express may be a peculiarly twentieth
century one, legislative rejection of Supreme Court interpretations
seems most acceptable when individual rights are not involved at all.
There may be uncertainty and inefficiency, but no person is denied
established legal expectations.
Legislative interposition is most troublesome when individual
rights are directly at stake, and the legislature purports to take away
what the Court has apparently granted. In a smoothly functioning
legal system, one part of the government does not take away what an
individual thinks he or she has been assured by another branch.
Now, it might be objected that this conclusion is circular, that my
assertion about individual expectations presupposes an extended force
to Supreme Court decisions that I must defend. After all, if individuals who are not parties to a case realize that legislatures may adopt
measures at odds with Supreme Court interpretations, they may not
develop firm expectations on the basis of what the Supreme Court has
said. The grain of truth in this objection is that individual expectations do bear some relationship to what the authority of Supreme
Court decisions is taken to be-but the objection is not very telling.
Remember, we are assuming a decision which there is strong reason to
believe the Supreme Court will stick to and whose implications for the
legislation involved are clear. The Supreme Court interpretations will
be followed by all but maverick or very ignorant lower courts and will
be sustained up the levels of review. So, regardless of one's assumptions about legislature propriety, the person whose position is backed
by Supreme Court doctrine has a strong expectation that his claimed
right will be legally enforceable. If that expectation is solidly
grounded, it will be disconcerting to have the right unacknowledged
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by other government officers until they are forced by court orders, it
will be unsettling to have the right temporarily violated, and it will be
annoying to spend one's time and money to litigate when the ultimate
outcome in one's favor is clear.
In my judgment, these considerations apply with even greater
force when the individual right is one the Court has indicated no government can infringe than when the right is derivative from some principle of separation of powers or division of powers. If one's only right
is not to be imposed upon by a particular branch of government, the
sense of deprivation and resentment from a temporary violation is
likely to be less."
How a rule against posting the Ten Commandments fits here is
somewhat controversial because of the peculiar nature of the Establishment Clause. Although in some broad way the basic principle of
nonestablishment supports the free exercise of religion, not every establishment impinges on an individual right directly. There might, for
example, be a school in which no child or parent is bothered by having
the Ten Commandments posted, and even if some people do object,
they may feel more that a public wrong is being done than that their
own rights are violated. On the other hand, some children and parents
in some places will regard the posting of the Ten Commandments as
an affront to their religious consciences.
Finally, there are two other critical dimensions not recognized by
the Attorney General: the level in the hierarchy of the legislative body
that is considering practical disregard of the Supreme Court's decision
and the degree of support that the legislature receives from other organs of government. It is one thing for Congress, a national body, to
pass legislation at odds with what the Supreme Court has decided; it is
quite another for a local school board to do so. If enough members of
Congress agree to adopt such legislation, that is a fact of which the
Supreme Court will become aware and the action reflects, at a minimum, that the decision is highly controversial. Though I do not want
to underestimate the political factors that might lead to voting against
the Court, a Congressional action of this kind typically indicates also
that a powerful constitutional argument can be mounted against what
the Court has decided.4" These indicia of seriousness and substance
are lacking when a school board or town council acts. Such actions
40. I accept the idea that one important reason lying behind the constitutional allocation of functions is to protect individual liberty; but I believe that this idea is not at odds with the text's supposition
about defeated expectations.
41. Cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98-91 (1969) (suggesting that the presumption of constitutionality should be weaker when local officials act than when

the state legislature acts).
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may disrupt the local application of a law, but, absent some important
unique local factor that the Court has yet failed to address, these local
actions are hardly substantial contributions to a dialogue with the
Supreme Court. Of course, if a majority of school boards in the country act, that is different, but such effective coordination is highly unlikely, and the campaign to achieve it would still not represent the
degree of serious thought present in a considered Congressional action. It does matter for a legislative body what position other organs
of government have taken. If a state legislature acts with the approval
of Congress or the President, it does not stand alone. And even when
Congress is deciding whether to act, the overall constellation of political forces can make a significant difference.
A subsidiary reason why legislative bodies other than Congress
should be extremely hesitant to authorize many actions that infringe
declared constitutional rights is that state executive officers who act on
42
such authorization may violate federal criminal and civil statutes.
The constraining factors I have suggested help to illumine the significance of Cooper v. Aaron,4 3 which is used by the Attorney General
as an extreme instance of the Court's arrogation of authority to itself." In an unusual opinion signed by all nine justices, the Court
demanded desegregation of Little Rock's schools. It claimed that its
decision in Brown v. Board of Education45 was the supreme law of the
land. By its original unanimous vote in Brown and subsequent reaffirmations, the Supreme Court had made clear that it was going to
stick with the constitutional rule that racially segregated schools are
impermissible. The rule guaranteed a right that many black citizens
regarded as vitally important. The disruptive effects of official resistance to the decision in Brown were not a subject of conjecture; they
were evidenced, sometimes in violent manifestations, thoughout the
South. It is hard to think of circumstances in which further official
resistance promised to be less constructive or more destructive. For
the Court in that setting to insist that local school boards did not have
a choice but had to conform with the principles of Brown was
understandable. a6
42. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 & 242 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). I recognize that good faith

misunderstandings about the reach of constitutional rights often will yield a defense for individual
officers; but I assume that when a federal constitutional right is clearly established by the Supreme
Court and known to be so, an executive officer could not succeed with a "good faith" claim that he and
a nonfederal legislative body deemed the Court to be mistaken.
43. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
44. Meese, supra note 1, at 12-13.
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. That indeed is much of the practical import of Herbert Wechsler's eloquent remarks on the
subject. See Wechsler, supra note 37.
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While I am confident Mr. Meese did not choose Cooper v. Aaron
in order to denigrate the importance of desegregation,47 he does say
without qualification that the Court in Cooper claimed too much for
itself,48 and he also says that state and local officials properly act on
their own constitutional interpretations in the face of contrary
Supreme Court doctrine.4 9 The clear and disturbing implication is
that state and local officials who disagreed with Brown did nothing
wrong in opposing its rule until subject themselves to judicial orders to
obey." I have said enough here to indicate why such a view is seriously mistaken.
My suggestions in this part of the essay can be summarized as
follows: legislatures, and most especially local bodies, should be very
hesitant to enact laws that fly directly in the face of Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution. Their hesitancy should be greatest
when they stand alone without other support and the laws would violate constitutional rights that the interpretations declare. However, in
extreme instances in which legislatures regard an interpretation as
both mistaken legally and highly unjust and that interpretation is not
yet a firmly settled aspect of law, registering disapproval by adopting
contrary legislation is appropriate. The Attorney General's underlying theoretical point that legislators need not accord Supreme Court
decisions the same status as the Constitution itself is correct; however,
the degree of constraint that legislators should exercise is very much
greater than what one might gather from his remarks.
3. Conceptualization
How should one conceptualize these conclusions? There are
three basic alternatives. The first is to say that legislatures, like lower
courts, are bound to follow Supreme Court precedents. 5 Any devia47. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), is used as an exemplar of the most ambitious claims on
behalf of Supreme Court decisions in constitutional law casebooks. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 25, at
32-33. However, representing an administration commonly criticized for being insensitive to the depths
of racial injustice in this country and for being opposed to needed corrective measures, the Attorney
General displayed a woeful insensitivity in using Cooper v. Aaron as he does without further

explanation.
48.

Meese, supra note I, at 12-13: "The logic of the dictum in Cooper v. Aaron was, and is, at war

with the Constitution, at war with the basic principles of democratic government, and at war with the
very meaning of the rule of law."
49. See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3.
50. In fact, in Cooper, supra, the school board was subject to federal district court order when
desegregation began.

51. One would, of course, need to introduce appropriate qualifications in respect to practices
significantly different from those the Supreme Court has passed on and in respect to precedents that
seem likely to be overruled.

1987]

CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS

tions could only be justified as possibly defensible extra-legal acts. 52
The other extreme is to say that legislatures are not really bound at all
to follow Supreme Court interpretations, though prudential political
considerations caution strongly against generating many conflicts with
the judicial branch. The third alternative is that legislatures are constrained by Supreme Court precedents in something like the manner
the Supreme Court itself is constrained. The precedents should generally be considered as having a legal force superior to legislation, but in
egregious enough instances they may be disregarded.
Because a full treatment of these alternatives would require a
much deeper account of what it means to be legally bound than I undertake, my comments here are summary. I reject the first alternative
because considering a legislature to be like a lower court as far as the
Supreme Court's interpretations is concerned does not adequately account for the distinction between branches of government and for the
appropriateness of occasional legislative calls for reconsideration as
the law of the Constitution develops. I reject the second alternative,
which is apparently the one Mr. Meese endorses, because I think both
our traditions and a sound analysis of the needs of a legal system suggest that general legislative acceptance of Supreme Court interpretations is much more than a matter of political prudence. 3 The oath to
uphold the Constitution, far from being a promise always to make
one's own interpretation and to act on it, must be understood in part
as an undertaking to participate conscientiously in a complex system
of governance and to assign an appropriate amount of authority to
those with the final say about how the Constitution will be interpreted.
This leaves us with the third alternative, that the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions are a kind of law for legislators but
not a law that is absolutely binding on all occasions. It is a law like
the "law" of prior cases for courts that have decided those cases. I do
not, of course, mean that the considerations that justify legislative disregard are exactly the same as justify overruling, though there will be
a substantial overlap among the considerations. I mean only that the
basic concept of a "law" that is usually but not always binding is
similar.
52. I consider a blatant refusal by a lower court to apply a precedent it is sure the Supreme Court
will follow to be an extra-legal act.
53. An interesting point of comparison is civil law countries, in which courts have less prestige
and judicial decisions less importance. It is reported that in Mexico, judicial determinations of unconstitutionality do not carry great authority with administration agencies and legislative bodies. R.
BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO 251 (1971). A valuable form of research would be to investi-

gate how great the strains are in systems in which determinations of unconstitutionality are often not
followed by political bodies.
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Picking the terms to express the "bindingness" of this law is more
troublesome. Usually "legal duties" are backed by coercive sanctions,
but officials are under legal duties for which there may be no sanctions
in the ordinary sense.54 A lower court judge violates a legal duty if he
or she willfully exceeds the limits of assigned jurisdiction or blatantly
ignores Supreme Court precedent. I do not think it is too great a
stretch to say that legislative respect for Supreme Court precedents is
also a matter of "legal duty," a duty imposed by the law understood as
a complex system for governance. Whether this is correct,"5 respect
for Supreme Court precedents is certainly a matter of "official duty."
A legislator who is indifferent to the force of Supreme Court decisions
is not only failing to exercise his legislative responsibilities in a wise
way, he is failing to perform one of his duties as a legislator.
V. STARK CONFLICTS AND EXECUTIVE ACTIONS

I now turn to actions by executive officers. Since the Attorney
General speaks of responses being made to Supreme Court decisions
through presidents, senators and representatives we elect at the national level and "through those we elect at the state and local level," 56
he plainly thinks refusal to adhere to the Court's constitutional interpretations is proper for at least some executive officers at all levels of
government.
I assume, as I indicated at the beginning of this lecture, that executive officials have a responsibility to do what is necessary to uphold
an actual judgment of a court, whether or not the government has
been a party to the case and regardless of their opinion of the judgment. 7 What concerns us here is executive adherence that goes beyond enforcement in this narrow sense.
One of the first things to notice is that many subordinate executive officers, that is, people who are directly responsible to some other
executive officer, take an oath to support the Constitution. We know
54. For this purpose, I do not count invalidation of an attempted exercise of authority as a "sanction." If that were regarded as a sanction, it would, of course, apply to the legislative efforts I have
discussed.
55. Interestingly, we face similar problems of terminology in trying to explain a court's responsibility to follow its own precedents that are not clearly wrong or unjust. Let us suppose we could agree
on a case in which a court should definitely have stuck to its own precedents but did not. We might
hesitate to say that the court had failed to perform a legal duty, but we could certainly be comfortable
in saying that it had failed to perform an important official duty.
56. Meese, supra note 1,at 16.
57. This is not to say that executive subversion of a court judgment could never be morally justified;
if what the court demands is too abhorrent, a failure to enforce might be the right response. But
such an intentional refusal to enforce would be extra-legal; an official's legal responsibility is to execute
the judgment.
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that many career lawyers in the Justice Department do not agree with
the present Administration's constitutional positions in some areas,
perhaps most notably affirmative action for racial minorities. If every
executive officer properly acted on his or her own interpretation of the
Constitution, the result would be chaos. It would be ludicrous to suppose that the oath of office requires such independent interpretation
and action."8 Like the oath of lower court judges, the oath of
subordinate executive officers shows that the taking of an oath to uphold and support the Constitution tells us relatively little about
whether independent interpretation in the face of settled Supreme
Court doctrine is called for.
The situation on which I focus here is one in which action that
flies directly in the face of a constitutional decision is being considered,
and the executive official who is considering the action is the one in the
jurisdiction whose claim to be able to disregard Supreme Court precedent would be strongest. The executive official might, for example, be
deciding whether searches or forms of punishment of a sort declared
unconstitutional will continue to be carried out, or whether actions,
such as integrating public schools, that Supreme Court doctrine says
are constitutionally required, will not be undertaken.
B. Independent Executive Action
In considering executive responsibilities with respect to Supreme
Court interpretations, we need to distinguish situations in which the
executive is on its own and those in which it is called upon to respond
to legislative action that conflicts with what the Supreme Court has
said. I think it is readily apparent that if the executive acts on its own,
its latitude to depart from Supreme Court decisions should be no
greater than that of the analogous legislative body in its jurisdiction.
The executive is less representative and is subordinate to the legislature as a policy-making body. At the least, the executive should be
subject to all the substantial constraints I have claimed are applicable
to legislatures, especially state and local ones.
Can one say more than this; can one say that the executive branch
should never fly in the face of a Supreme Court decision absent some
legislative support that postdates the decision?59 I want to distinguish
roughly between domains of subject matter.
58. The well-settled rule that administrative agencies do not pass on the constitutionality of the
legislative measures that confer power on them, see, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2724 (1986), is only one legal doctrine that rejects the appropriateness of
such independent interpretation.
59. As a proposer of laws, the executive could urge reenactment on the legislature.
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First, suppose a subject is one that is not only within legislative
competence, but has traditionally been dealt with by rather specific
legislation. The Court declares invalid a legislative effort. The executive must decide whether as a general matter to follow the Supreme
Court's decision or to continue to enforce against nonparties the statutory provision the Court has said is not valid. Since the general practice is not to enforce legislative norms that have been declared
unconstitutional, the question is whether the executive should depart
from that practice if it deems a constitutional decision to be mistaken.
It is tempting to say that if any government body is appropriately
to register its disapproval here, it should be the legislature. Perhaps
the executive, then, should not proceed to disregard what the Supreme
Court has done unless it is supported by its own legislature or one that
is higher. There are powerful reasons to accept such a principle of
executive restraint. If the executive enforces court judgments supported by particular principles of law but reverts to contrary principles
of law prior to the entry of judgments, the result will be disarray. Further, given modern extension of the use of class actions, it is often a
fortuity whether a person is covered by a judgment or not. For the
appropriateness of executive action to turn on whether someone formally happens to have been included in a huge class of parties does not
make much sense.6 ° I conclude that when a subject lies within the
legislative domain, the executive should always adhere to constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court absent some legislative
support for disregard.
Other matters are essentially executive responsibilities. Though
not necessarily beyond legislative competence, they are generally left
to executive decision. This is true, for example, about many detailed
rules regarding police behavior during arrests or the conditions of confinement in jails. The Supreme Court might declare a rule formulated
by the executive unconstitutional or simply decide that an executive
officer's action on a particular occasion has violated constitutional
rights. Since nothing the legislature has done may be involved, it is
unlikely, though not inconceivable, that the legislature will respond by
passing legislation that conflicts with what the Supreme Court has
said. In such a circumstance, if any branch is to register a disapproving response it may have to be the executive.
In respect to arrests and confinement, however, the executive lies
60. Since legislative action will generally be forward looking, a new statute will usually not result

in treating people differently depending on whether they happen to have been parties in the original
case. However, that consequence could occur if the judicial remedy in the case was one that extended
into the future, or if the legislation explicitly reached transactions that occurred contemporaneously
with those underlying the original case.
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under a particular liability: its own degree of interestedness. The executive is in a powerful sense a party to the conflict that gives rise to
these constitutional disputes. It is important to understand clearly
what I mean. Members of a political body are to a degree committed
to the legitimacy of what they have decided to do. That kind of interestedness will infect any response to Supreme Court invalidation. But
what is at issue as to arrest and punishment is the executive's carrying
out of its own enforcement responsibilities in a manner it deems effective and convenient. The Supreme Court decision blocks it from pursuing its enforcement goals and creates rights in persons the operating
executive officers may see as their "opponents" in a very serious game.
In these settings, it is particularly hard for the executive to achieve a
requisite degree of detachment about appropriate constitutional principles, and outsiders and the courts may view a disapproving executive
response as an interested defense of turf, rather than as a serious contribution to dialogue.
In some other areas the executive branch sets policy more in the
manner of a legislature, usually because an executive agency is delegated wide discretion by the legislature to implement broad objectives.
A housing authority might, for example, employ racial criteria for
public housing units in an effort to maintain integrated housing. Its
"interest" here does not involve the effective functioning of the executive branch itself. If the authority's criteria are declared unconstitutional, the legislature will probably not be sufficiently concerned and
united to intervene. In such settings, the argument for independent
executive action in the face of conflicting Supreme Court interpretations is strongest; but even in these cases an executive should be extremely hesitant to generate a conflict with Supreme Court precedents.
I have thus far omitted a crucial consideration: the practical legal
status of the executive acts that would conflict with what the Supreme
Court has decided. If those acts violated individual constitutional
rights clearly declared by the Court, the officials would be subject to
federal criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. Sections 241 and 242,61 and
61.

18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) states in part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ...
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life.

18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) states:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being
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to civil remedies, either under 42 U.S.C. Section 198362 or directly
under the Constitution.6 3 Under present law, an executive official
would not be relieved of either criminal or civil liability for violating a
clearly declared right merely because he believed that the rights had
been declared mistakenly. If the federal executive were determined to
implement the declared right, a state official acting against the Court's
decision would face the practical prospect of criminal penalties as well
as civil damages. Federal officers acting with higher approval and
state officers taking a position with which the federal executive agreed
might escape criminal prosecution,'$but might still be subject to tort
liability.
Although the consequences of violations of declared rights
strongly suggest that executive officials should be extremely hesitant to
engage in such violations, the use of these consequences as an argument against reliance on independent executive judgment might be
challenged as a kind of bootstrapping. The issue, after all, is how
much authority judicial decisions should have. It is unfair to answer
this question by relying on judicial interpretations of vaguely worded
statutes and on judicially created constitutional remedies that themselves may embody the very perspective of high respect for judicial
authority that is being challenged. The worry about such bootstrapping is, indeed, one reason that I have placed the main emphasis of my
analysis elsewhere. But the present law of remedies for constitutional
violations does indicate how firmly entrenched is the idea that the
Supreme Court can authoritatively declare constitutional rights. Further, it is hard to imagine that anyone would want to allow state and
local officials to use as a defense to criminal and civil actions the sincere belief of themselves or their bosses that the Supreme Court's conan alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;
and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
See United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 U.S. 1155 (1977);
United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
63. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (civil remedy implied directly under the Constitution); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979);
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
64. See supra note 34 on the delicate question whether the federal executive should accept the
Court's view in deciding whether to prosecute.
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stitutional interpretations were mistaken. Such a defense would create
too great a gap in the protection of constitutional rights.6 5
C. Executive Reaction to Conflicting Legislation
What the executive should do in response to legislation that requires or authorizes executive action that the Supreme Court has said
is constitutionally impermissible is more troublesome. Imagine that
legislation requires that under certain conditions prisoners be confined
in a way the Court has declared violates the eighth amendment, or
that the legislature authorizes such confinement without requiring it.
We can posit three alternative standards for executive action. Executives might regard themselves as always bound to follow the legislature
until they are subject to contrary court orders in particular cases, or
until a new declaration is made by the Supreme Court6 6 that the practice is unconstitutional; executives might regard themselves as always
bound to follow the Court's decisions; or executives might make some
independent judgment in deciding whom to follow.
In my discussion of legislative action, I have already rejected the
second possibility. There, I indicated that if the executive is always to
follow the Court, it would make no sense to say that legislatures might
appropriately enact fresh conflicting legislation. Such legislation is
warranted only if there is a possibility it will be acted upon by the
executive. Since I have concluded that in extreme circumstances such
legislation may be proper, I have assumed that executive enforcement
of it may sometimes be appropriate, though any prospect of federal
criminal penalties certainly would exercise a considerable chill on
choosing that course.
Should the executive always follow the legislative judgment or
should it exercise some independent determination?
An initial point to notice here is that the case of legislative authorization is different from the case of legislative requirement. Suppose that the legislature authorizes confinement that the executive
believes has properly been declared unconstitutional. Its refusal to use
one authorized form of confinement does not conflict with what the
legislature has done. It can comply with the legislation and with the
court decision simply by not using this form of confinement. In the
case of mere authorization, the executive should clearly not follow the
65. 1 leave it to others more sympathetic with the overall practical implications of Mr. Meese's
thesis to consider how this problem of remedies might be addressed. One can imagine a federal statute
that immunized from criminal prosecution acts undertaken on the authority of designated officials
within a state after a formal determination by them rejecting a Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine.
66. I pass over whether a lower court declaration, or such a declaration followed by a Supreme
Court decision not to review, would suffice.
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legislative judgment about the Constitution6 7 unless it thinks that the
judgment is correct.
A requirement to act is different. When that is involved the executive cannot avoid a conflict; it must either follow the legislature or
the Supreme Court. It is widely supposed that when measures do not
impinge on executive prerogatives, the executive should enforce clear
legislative mandates even when it doubts the constitutionality of those
mandates. 68 But our traditions also include the notion that a Supreme
Court declaration of invalidity relieves the executive of responsibility
to enforce against anyone the statutory provision that has been declared invalid. The question is whether reenactment of the same provision, or of a different provision that clearly conflicts with a Supreme
Court decision, creates a new responsibility to enforce.
The executive might make at least two kinds of judgments about
what the legislature has done. One concerns the constitutional issue
over which the Court and legislature disagree; the other concerns the
inherent appropriateness of the legislature having acted in the way it
did. These are separate judgments. It is possible that the executive
will embrace the interpretation of the legislature, but regard the issue
as much too minor to warrant fresh conflicting legislation; 69 or the
executive may think the Court's interpretation is correct but recognize
that the issue is of such tremendous significance that a negative response by the legislature was within the range of what was appropriate
for that institution.
The potential legal consequences facing the executive are also important. The relevant legislature could ordinarily provide some way
that civil damages would not fall upon individual officials if constitutional rights are violated by adherence to legislation. If the legislature
really wants its statute enforced, that form of immunization is only
fair. Were a federal statute to require acts, one presumably would
construe the criminal civil rights provisions not to cover those acts;
that could, of course, be made explicit in the fresh federal statute.
State and local legislatures cannot immunize officers from federal
prosecution, but concerned officials in the state might seek protective
67. This was the Justice Department's response to Congressional legislation that effectively purported to overrule the Miranda decision. See H. FRIENDLY, THE CONSTITUTION (U.S. Dept. of Justice
Bicentennial Lecture Series 1976).
68. See the argument of Benjamin Curtis during the impeachment proceeding of Andrew Johnson, in SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (4th ed. 1977).
69. I recognize that what might count as "too minor" is itself somewhat troublesome, especially
since an inherently unimportant issue, whether the Ten Commandments can be posted on the classroom wall, may be seen as a symbol of a much greater issue, the place of religion in public schools.
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federal legislation or assurances that the Department of Justice would
not prosecute.
If the executive agrees with the legislature's interpretation and
thinks its action was appropriate, and is not subject to adverse legal
consequences, it should enforce the new law until constrained again by
the judiciary. If the executive thinks the legislature's interpretation
was wrong and its action inappropriate, it should refuse to enforce.
Although an argument might be made that the executive's decision
whether to veto is the only occasion for an exercise of judgment about
what the legislature has chosen to do, the executive is an independent
branch of government. It should not consider itself bound to carry out
legislation that it regards as unconstitutional and seriously misguided
when its judgment on constitutionality has already been adopted by
the Supreme Court. That the executive should have some independent
function here is strongly suggested both by the disruption caused by
enforcement that is bound to be overturned by judicial decree and by
the reality that legislators may often act inappropriately for political
profit instead of developing considered judgments about the Constitution and their own role in a legal system.7 °
What the executive should do if it thinks the legislature's action
inappropriate but correct in its constitutional interpretation or "appropriate" but incorrect constitutionally is more debatable. I am inclined to think that both inquiries count significantly and that a new
law should not be enforced unless the executive thinks the legislature
has at least passed a threshold of reasonableness in respect to both
dimensions. 7
I shall not repeat my discussion of the conceptual issues about the
"legal" force of Supreme Court decisions. These issues are essentially
the same in respect to the executive as the legislature, though the prospect of criminal penalties and civil damages for executive officers
makes one much more comfortable in saying that executive officials lie
under a legal duty to adhere to what the Court says. I also do not
address quasi-independent administrative agencies and what they do,
70. The fact that executives usually do not have item vetoes is further support for this conclusion,
since an unconstitutional provision may be lodged in legislation the executive otherwise approves and
does not want to veto.
71. More precisely, if the executive thinks a legislative action is rightly regarded as unconstitutional, but recognizes that the issue is close and is important enough to warrant judicial reassessment, it
might properly enforce a fresh law. If the executive thinks the new law is inappropriate, but not clearly
so, and is constitutionally sound, it may properly enforce it. However, if the executive thinks the new
law is unreasonable in its constitutional interpretation, however important the social issue, or that the
new law, though correct in its constitutional premises, is a clearly inappropriate response to a decision
of minor importance, then the executive should not enforce the law.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Without judging the appropriate level of complexity of a public
speech by an Attorney General, I hope I have shown that Mr. Meese's
remarks, like many other comments on the authority of Supreme
Court decisions, are too simplistic for any serious attempt to grapple
with what is at stake practically and with our conceptualization of the
boundaries of law and official duty. I have actually endorsed Mr.
Meese's basic premise that members of political branches are not always bound absolutely to adhere to Supreme Court interpretations of
the Constitution, but I have also concluded that, standing alone, any
statement that the Court's decisions do not have the same status as the
Constitution is woefully misleading. Officials usually should adhere to
the Court's interpretations even when they think those interpretations
are wrong; the soundest conceptual view sees them as under a legal or
official duty to do so, and the occasions for appropriate disregard of
those interpretations are extremely rare, especially for state and local
officials. If we use as an example the testing case that Mr. Meese defends, a state legislator's support of a law authorizing the posting of
the Ten Commandments after Stone v. Graham, my conclusion is exactly the opposite of the Attorney General's. I think such support was
an irresponsible action out of accord with our healthy traditions of the
status of Supreme Court decisions, an action that, although not by
itself disqualifying, bore negatively on the qualifications of a judicial
appointee.
If my immediate main conclusion is that Supreme Court decisions have a more authoritative status than the Attorney General indicates, my primary objective here will be fulfilled if this discussion
contributes to a level of reasoned exchange about the many genuinely
difficult and debatable issues that this subject includes, a level of reasoned exchange that transcends the comfortable overstatements that
so often substitute for serious thought.

